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THE LEGITIMACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
DESTRUCTION IN MODERN WARFARE: 
CUSTOMARY SUBSTANCE OVER CONVENTIONAL 
FORM 
Mark J.T. Caggiano* 
Laws are silent in time of war. 
Cicero l 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On January 22, 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi armed 
forces deliberately released oil from two tankers into the Persian 
Gulf.2 Several subsequent spills by the Iraqis increased the flow of 
oil into the Gulf.3 Initial estimates of the total amount of oil intro-
duced into the Gulf ran as high as 11 million4 barrels,5 while later 
reports suggested that only 1.5 million barrels were spilled. 6 One 
on-site investigator claimed that the figure was between 6 and 8 
million barrels. 7 Even assuming that the lowest estimate is correct, 
• Production Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. The author would like to thank his wife Michelle for her patience and his newborn son 
Nicholas Christopher for his forbearance. 
1 Pro Milone, §4. While the laws of the nation, or jus civile, may have fallen silent in the 
wake of ancient wars, the laws of nations, or jus gentium, remained clear during the course 
of Roman combat. See, e.g. infra notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text. Special thanks to 
Dean Daniel Coquillette for his Latin translation and textual explanation. 
2 Abdullah Toukan, The Gulf War and the Environment: The Needfor a Treaty Prohibiting 
Ecological Destruction as a Weapon of War, 15 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 95, 96 (1991). 
3 [d. 
4 Amanda Brown, Allies Begin to Clear-up World's Biggest Oil Slick, Press Assoc. Ltd., 
Feb. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Press Assoc. Newsfile. 
5 A "barrel" contains approximately 42 gallons of oil. Interview with Richard Golob, Director 
of the Oil Pollution Bulletin, Jan. 22, 1992. 
6 Charles Clover, The Gulf War: Slick Threat Scaled Down By Saudis, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Feb. 21, 1991. 
7 Golob interview supra note 5. The normal manner of assessing the amount of spillage-
479 
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the effects of the spill upon the Persian Gulf marine ecosystem will 
be far reaching. The spill greatly curtailed fishing in the Gulf,8 threat-
ened cormorant and sea turtle nesting areas,9 and poisoned rare 
mangrove trees. 10 The giant oil slick posed a direct threat to the 
human population because of its anticipated destructive effects upon 
the Persian Gulf desalination plants which provide much of the pot-
able water to the people of the arid Arabian Peninsula. 11 
The oil release was only Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's first 
act of "environmental terrorism. "12 Toward the end of the Gulf con-
flict, during the February, 1991 retreat of Iraq's forces from Kuwait, 
Iraqi soldiers set ablaze 732 oil wells,13 presumably at the direction 
of President Hussein and his high command. 14 Teams of observers 
estimated that the daily release of heat from these conflagrations 
was approximately 86 billion watts-similar to that of a five hundred 
acre forest fire. 15 The fires created smoke clouds that stretched over 
hundred of miles, shrouding Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United 
Arab Emirates, and parts of Iraq, Iran, Oman, and Yemen with 
smoke and soot. 16 The fires consumed approximately 4,600,000 bar-
rels of oil daily and released 1,900,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide 
(C02), 20,000 metric tons of sulfur dioxide (S02), and 12,000 metric 
gauging how much oil was in a tanker and then seeing how much is left in the tanker after 
the spill-was not applicable to the Gulf spill because oil was dumped from up to five different 
tankers and directly from an island pumping terminal. Id. Because there was no starting 
baseline for the oil spill calculations, the spill amount was extrapolated by experts from 
measurements of oil that collected on Saudi Arabian beaches to the south of the spill. I d. 
8 Gilles Trequesser, Prized Gulf Shrimp Latest Casualty of World's Worst Oil Slick, Reu-
ters, Feb. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Reuters file. Interestingly, one 
investigator claimed that although fish may have initially been adversely affected by the spill, 
the lapse in commercial fishing brought on by the fear of the war and contamination may have 
acted to increase the diminished fish population. Golob interview supra note 5. 
9 Thomas Y. Canby, After the Storm, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, August 1991, at 16-17. 
10 Id. at 25. 
11 See Canby supra note 9, at 14-15. It is important to note that these desalination plants 
also supplied water to the international coalition forces which threatened Iraq's position in 
occupied Kuwait. See, John M. Broder & Maura Dolan, Iraq Unleashing Oil into Gulf, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at 1. 
12 Pat Towell, The Oil Weapon, 49 CONGo Q. WKLY. REP., 302, 302 (1991). 
13 Golob interview, supra note 5. 
14 Eyewitness accounts from Kuwaiti oil workers indicate that the detonation of the oil wells 
was a well coordinated strategy rather than a haphazard act of a defeated army. See Canby 
supra note 9 at 12. However, organization and premeditation do not necessarily transform 
Iraq's oil warfare from a concert of spite into a legitimate act of military necessity. See infra 
note 166 and accompanying text. 
15 Sylvia A. Earle, Persian Gulf Pollution: Assessing the Damage One Year Later, NAT'L 
GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1992, at 129. 
16 Earle, supra note 15 at 130. 
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tons of soot particles daily into the atmosphere. 17 Nearly 10,000 
workers from thirty-four countries, using 125,000 tons of equipment 
required eight months to extinguish all the fires. 18 The Kuwaiti 
government estimated the value of the oil lost at $12 billion (U.S.).19 
Initial fears that the plumes of smoke would affect global weather 
patterns seem to have been unfounded,20 although the smoke did 
effect local weather patterns.21 United States health and environ-
mental agencies continue to monitor the effects of the oil spills and 
fires on the people of Kuwait as well as on the Persian Gulf environ-
ment. 22 Experts can only guess at the long-term damage that this 
wide-spread environmental destruction has wrought. 23 
With the end of hostilities in the Gulf War in February 1991, some 
members of the Congress have called for the establishment of a war 
crimes tribunal, to consider not only the abuses of human rights 
resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but also for the environ-
mental damage caused to the Persian Gulf environment.24 The suc-
cess of such efforts to prosecute President Hussein for "ecocide"25 
will depend in large part on whether his deeds are actionable under 
existing international law. 
This Comment examines whether environmental destruction on 
the scale present in the Persian Gulf War is prohibited under existing 
17Id. 
18 Matthew L. Wald, Amid Ceremony and Ingenuity, Kuwait's Oil-Well Fires are Declared 
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at Al. The final well was actually extinguished on November 
6th, but was reignited so the Emir of Kuwait could ceremoniously re-extinguish it. Id. 
19Id. 
20 Toukan, supra note 2, at 98-99. 
21Id. at 98; Earle, supra note 15 at 129. See D.W. Johnson et al. Airborne Observations of 
the Physical and Chemical Characteristics of the Kuwaiti Oil Smoke Plume, 353 NATURE 
617, 621 (1991). 
22 Earle, supra note 15, at 128-29. Some experts feel that it will be two or three years 
before the data is completely analyzed. Id. at 128. 
23 Golob interview, supra note 5. 
24 David Freed, Hussein Trial Urged over Oil Damage, L.A. TIMES, March 18, 1991, at Al 
(Sen. John Kerry). 
25 "Ecocide" has been defined by one scholar as the use of certain acts with the "intent to 
disrupt or destroy, in whole or in part, a human ecosystem." RICHARD A. FALK, REVITALIZING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 188-89 (1989) ("Proposed Convention on the Crime of Ecocide"). Acts 
constituting ecocide include the use of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, bacte-
riological, or chemical; attempts to provoke natural disasters such as volcanoes, earthquakes, 
or floods; the military use of defoliants; the use of bombs to impair soil quality or to enhance 
the prospect of disease; the bulldozing of forest or crop lands for military purposes; attempts 
to modify weather or climate as a hostile act; or the forcible and permanent removal of humans 
or animals from their habitual places of habitation on a large scale to expedite the pursuit of 
military or other objectives. Id. An expansive definition of "chemical weapons of mass de-
struction" could include crude oil. 
482 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:479 
customary and conventional international laws of war. Section II of 
this Comment explores the landscape of international law in general. 
Section III focuses in on the Law of War as embodied in conventions, 
treaties, and other international instruments. Section IV examines 
the role of customary international law in the context of armed 
conflict. Section V surveys the developing body of international law 
which prohibits the destruction of the environment by warring 
states. Section VI examines the applicability of this body of law to 
the Persian Gulf War and suggests some directions in which the 
international community may wish to look in order to address the 
ancient dilemma of environmental terrorism. 26 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONVENTIONAL V. CUSTOMARY LAW 
International law may be broken down into conventional law, 
which is based on treaties, conventions, or protocols-all equivalent 
terms-between nations; and customary law, which derives from the 
general practices of nations. 27 In such a document, states may agree 
upon certain issues regarding their respective responsibilities and 
may codify this consensus in written form.28 The signing parties, or 
signatories, therefore clearly are aware of what is expected of 
them. 29 
Some scholars have likened a treaty to a private law contract in 
that both simply create rights and obligations. 30 Under this analysis, 
treaties are contracts which use and reflect international law on a 
limited scale; reflect existing international law in a more elaborate 
manner-a declaratory or "codificatory" treaty-and create new ob-
26 Even at the dawn of the Roman Empire, Roman troops razed the city of Carthage and 
sowed the surrounding land with salt. See Saddam: Eco-criminal?, 8 ENVT'L F. 10, 10 (1991). 
'" Bernard Schafer, The Relationship Between the International Laws of Armed Conflict 
and Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct are Permis-
sible During Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 287, 288 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
"There are two primary sources of international law: conventions and customs. Con-
ventional international law consists of multilateral or bilateral treaties that set out 
in detail the responsibilities of signing parties. Customary international law is more 
difficult to define. It is said to be 'international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law.' It consists of two elements: an empirical, or general practice 
among nations; and a psychological element, or opinio juris, which shows that these 
nations have accepted this general practice as international law. " I d. 
28 See id.; see also David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L 
L. & POL'y 1, 33 (1987) ("hard basis in consent"). 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g. MAARTEN Bos, A METHODOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1984). 
1993] ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE 483 
ligations which in time may become general customary international 
law.3! 
Customary international law is more amorphous than conventional 
international law, springing both from the general practice, or per-
haps behavior, of states and from the global acceptance of this prac-
tice as law.32 Some central elements of customary international law 
include a common practice by a number of states within the domain 
of international relations; a continuation or repetition of the practice 
over a considerable period of time; a conception that the practice is 
required by or consistent with, prevailing international law; and a 
general acquiescence by states toward the practice. 33 
Treaties also may have a significance that transcends their status 
as contractual undertakings, because these documents may indicate 
state practice attended by a legal conviction as to the practice's 
binding force.34 In this sense, some treaties are a source of customary 
law. For example, when a large number of states ratify a treaty for 
the purpose of declaring their understanding of current international 
law on a particular subject or to lay down new rules of conduct for 
states, this indicates a development in the body of customary inter-
national law. 35 
One common forum for disputes arising under international law is 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, as annexed to the United Nations Charter, 
defines what body of law shall be considered by that international 
judicial body.36 In this system of precedence, conventional law, in 
the form of treaties, protocols, or conventions-again, all terms 
referring to international agreements-is preeminent over custom-
31Id. 
32 See id. at 2, Kennedy supra note 28 at 33. 
33 Bos supra note 30 at 62; see also Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human 
Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 11 (Hurst Hannum ed. 
1986). Some scholars have suggested a more expedient system of "instant customary law." 
See Louis B. Sohn, The Development of the Charter of the United Nations, in THE PRESENT 
STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Maarten Bos ed. 1973) (quoted in Bos supra note 30, at 63). 
Under such a system, the resolutions voted on by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
rather than serving simply as recommendations as specified by the U.N. Charter, would bind 
members of United Nations as international law. Id. This theory, however, has met with 
criticism. See e.g. Bos, supra note 30, at 63. 
34 Antonio Cassesse, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed 
Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN J. 55, 58 (1984). 
36 JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION INTO THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 59 (1955). 
36 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, reprinted in 1983 U.N.Y.B. 
1334. 
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ary law, which is in turn preeminent over scholarly works on inter-
national law. 37 This system closely follows the American common law 
system: statute, common law, secondary authorities. 
The distinction between conventional and customary international 
law is clouded, however, when a state contravenes the tenets of a 
treaty to which it was not a party. For example, by deliberately 
dumping oil into the Persian Gulf and by setting ablaze the oil wells 
of occupied Kuwait, Iraq contravened several express provisions of 
the 1977 Protocol (I) Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 38 
Iraq, however, has not signed or ratified the Protocol and therefore 
is not a party to it.39 As under any private law contract, a party is 
not responsible for contractual provisions it has not signed onto--
unless however these provisions represent a conventional embodi-
ment of otherwise generally binding customary law. 40 
In keeping with the assertion that customary law may grow out 
of developments in conventional law, one commentator has suggested 
that the international Law of War and international environmental 
law have begun to converge and now share a common value system.41 
37Id. 
38 Protocol (I) Additional of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, signed Dec. 12, 1977, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter "Protocol I"]. 
"Article 35 
1) In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited. 
2) It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
3) It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. . . 
Article 55 
1) Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or 
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural 
environment and therefore prejudice the health or survival of the population. 
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited." Id. (emphasis 
added). See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text. 
33 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITlONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1556-57 
(1987). [hereinafter "Commentary"]. Neither the United States nor Iraq are parties to this 
Protocol. Id. Great Britain, France, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, other major members of the 
Persian Gulf War coalition, however, are parties. Id. 
40 Therefore, the treaty simply restates the law as it already exists in the form of a custom. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Pt. VI, at 102 (1987) (discusses customary aspects of Law of the Sea Convention which U.S. 
did not ratify); see also Cassesse supra note 34 at 59 (multinational treaties can codify 
customary law while also making additions). 
41 Schafer, supra note 27 at 287. 
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This common value system could be used by members of a war crimes 
tribunal to interpret various passages of the Law of War as proscrib-
ing certain environmental damage during armed conflict and prohib-
iting the manipulation of the environment for hostile purposes.42 The 
chronological development of modern treaties pertaining to the Law 
of War provides insight into this suggested convergence between 
the Law of War and the law of the environment by highlighting the 
existing conventional prohibitions against environmental destruc-
tion. This examination of the evolution of conventional international 
policy also has significant bearing on the subsequent development of 
customary international law. 43 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENTIONAL LAW OF WAR 
A. The Law 01 the Hague 
In 1874, the nations of Europe met at a conference at which 
Alexander II of Russia proposed that they endeavor to gain control 
of the forces of war which had been unleashed in a number of bloody 
conflictS.44 A treaty was drafted, but the governments of the attend-
ing states rejected this document, which was perhaps inevitable 
given the inflamed passions recent events had produced on the Con-
tinent.45 
In 1899, many of the leaders of the world accepted the unsigned 
treaty of 1874 in the form of the 1899 Hague Convention with Re-
spect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land.46 Several years 
later, in 1907, further restrictions on warfare were made in a number 
of associated treaties again negotiated at the Hague. 47 
Generally, the 1907 Hague Conventions are the source of law that 
defines crimes of war. 48 This series of four treaties enumerates im-
permissible methods of warfare and limits the extent to which a 
42 Id. 
43 See infra notes at 101-72 and accompanying text. 
44 SHELDON COHEN, ARMS AND JUDGEMENT 4 (1988). 
46 Id. at 5 (Franco-Prussian War). 
46 1 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPPL. 129 (1907) [hereinafter "Hague 1899"]. 
47 Of greatest interest for the purposes of Saddam Hussein and his environmental warfare 
is the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (IV), Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. no. 539, reprinted in U.S. NAVY DEPT., HAGUE AND GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS (1911) [hereinafter "Hague Convention IV"]. 
43 DONALD WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR, 8 (1984). 
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state may wage war. 49 In the context of environmental protection, 
the most relevant sections are Articles 23(a) , 23(b), and 23(h) of 
Hague Convention IV.50 These "environmental" provisions prohibit, 
for example, the use of poisonous weapons and the unnecessary 
destruction or seizure of enemy property. 51 
It is difficult, however, to analogize from these treaties to a mod-
ern military context. For example, armies historically directed poi-
son and poison weapons at soldiers in the field or civilians rather 
than directly at the environment, thereby making it difficult to as-
certain whether the protection these provisions seemingly afford to 
the environment was simply incidental to the protection of human 
beings and personal property. 52 
The Hague Convention IV also limited the powers of an occupying 
military power-such as Iraq in occupied Kuwait-particularly when 
the victorious occupying forces attempt to plunder the seized lands. 53 
The convention establishes a trust-like relationship in which the 
occupying state may enjoy the profits of the land, but must otherwise 
safeguard these properties, presumably in anticipation of their re-
turn to the occupied state's government. 54 
For example, after World War II, German civilian administrators 
who had operated in occupied Poland were charged with war crimes 
for excessively exploiting the Polish forests for timber during the 
Nazi occupation. 55 These administrators had harvested the Polish 
49 E.g. Hague IV, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. no. 539, supra note 47, at 58--62. Prohibited methods 
of war include poison weapons and use of a flag of truce for treachery. [d. at 59, 62. Limitations 
on the scope of warfare include declaring "no quarter," the unnecessary destruction of prop-
erty, and the bombardment of "buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charity, his-
torical monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided 
they are not being used at the same time for military purposes." [d. at 59-60. 
60 Hague Convention IV, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. no. 539, supra note 47, at 58-59. These articles 
respectively prohibit, "employ[ing] poison or poisonous weapons. . . to kill or wound treach-
erously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army," and "destroy[ing] or seiz[ing] the 
enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the ne-
cessities of war." [d. at art. 23(a), 23(b), & 23(h). 
61 [d. 
62 See, F ALK, supra note 25, at 171. The neglect of the environment as a distinct concern 
seems consistent with the overall view that nature exists solely for the use of humankind. [d. 
63 Hague Convention IV, Art. 55, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. no. 539, supra note 47. "The occupying 
State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, 
forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied 
country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance 
with the rule of usufruct." [d. A "usufructuary" may be defined as one who has the right of 
enjoying anything in which he has no property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. 
1990). 
64 F ALK, supra note 25, at 171. 
66 [d. 
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forests beyond what was deemed necessary to preserve the wood-
lands of the country, and thus contravened Germany's legal obliga-
tion to sustain the resource base of occupied Poland. 56 In the case of 
the Persian Gulf War, for example, Iraq clearly did not adhere to 
this obligation to preserve the resources of occupied Kuwait. 57 
B. The Law of Geneva 
Military strategists during World War I rather emphatically ig-
nored the Hague stricture against the use of poisonous weapons. 58 
In response to these transgressions, the nations of the world drafted 
the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, reaffirming the earlier ban on chem-
ical and bacteriological weapons. 59 Nations have complied almost 
universally with this direct prohibition against the use of poison gas, 
causing some commentators to argue that the Geneva Gas Protocol 
has slipped into the realm of customary law. 60 Interestingly, one of 
the few nations believed to have used chemical weapons since the 
Geneva Gas Protocol came into effect is Iraq, which is alleged to 
have used chemical weapons against Iranians during the Iran-Iraq 
War. 61 
After World War II-a devastating conflict even without the use 
of poison gas- the Allies drafted treaties which further expanded 
the Hague Conventions in response to the war crimes of Germany, 
Japan and Italy.62 These new treaties focused mainly on protecting 
56 Id. at 172. 
57 Iraqi soldiers went so far as to eat animals in the Kuwait City Zoo. Canby, supra note 9, 
at 16. 
58 Jozef Goldblat, The Environmental Modification Convention of 1977: An Analysis, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ApPRAISAL 49-50 (Arthur 
H. Westing ed. 1984) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL WARFAREJ. 
59 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 
[hereinafter "Geneva Gas Protocol"J. 
60 See William O'Brien, Biological/Chemical Waif are and the International Law of War, 51 
GA. L. REV. 32, 35 (1962). Many state parties to the Gas Protocol, however, have reserved 
the right to use chemical irritants, such as tear gas, in warfare and in domestic law enforcement 
and have reserved the right to use herbicides during warfare. Goldblat supra note 58, at 50. 
Additionally, the "five powers" limited applicability of the Gas Protocol to "first use" of gas 
weapons, reserving the right to retaliate with these weapons. Id. 
61 F ALK, supra note 25, at 169. Iraq, however, when signing the Gas Protocol, made certain 
reservations to the effect that it would not be bound by the Protocol vis-a-vis a non-Party to 
the Protocol. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 144 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds. 
1982). Iran has never signed the treaty. See id. If the Protocol has become international 
customary law, however, Iraq's reservations would not protect it because every state would 
be bound by the Protocol. In any event, Kuwait is a Party to the treaty. Id. at 142. 
62 WELLS, supra note 48, at 8. 
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civilians and the wounded rather than on limiting the conduct of 
belligerent states per se. 63 
In the context of environmental destruction, the 1949 Geneva 
Convention IV64 contains language very similar to that of the Hague 
Convention IV prohibiting the destruction of private or public prop-
erty unless rendered absolutely necessary by military necessity.65 
Unfortunately, this similarity of language seems to serve only to 
reaffirm the established Hague principles rather than provide fur-
ther protection for the environment. 66 Additional efforts have been 
made by the nations of the world, however, to expand the Law of 
War so as to proscribe environmental destruction in the course of 
warfare. 
c. Modern Developments in the Conventional Law of War 
Regarding the Environment 
1. The Environmental Modification Convention 
The nations of the world first specifically addressed the problem 
of environmental destruction in the course of warfare in the 1977 
Environmental Modification Convention (En-Mod Convention).67 The 
nations of the world drafted this convention in response to the mas-
sive, albeit unsuccessful, attempts by the United States to use 
weather modification to harass the North Vietnamese during the 
Vietnam War.68 The convention obligates its signatories not to en-
gage in military or other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other State Party. 69 
63 Id. 
64 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter "Geneva Convention IV"]. 
65 Geneva Convention IV, art. 536, U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. "Any destruction by the 
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private 
persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, 
is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operation." Id. See, FALK, supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
66 See supra notes 48--50 and accompanying text. One author has suggested that the Geneva 
provisions are not applicable to the Iraqi occupation. Rex. J. Zedalis, Burning of the Kuwaiti 
Oil Fields and the Laws of War, 24 VAN. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 714, 729 (1991). 
67 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, 31 U.S. T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614. [hereinafter "En-Mod Convention"] 
68 See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI), WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 59 (1977). 
69 En-Mod Art. 1(1), 31 U.S. T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, supra note 67. 
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Environmental modification techniques include any techniques for 
deliberately changing the dynamics, composition, or structure of the 
Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmo-
sphere, or of outer space. 70 
Unfortunately, the En-Mod Convention has been interpreted by 
scholars as encompassing only a limited variety of environmental 
manipulations. 71 The modifications which seem to be at the heart of 
the En-Mod Convention involve directly using nature's power to 
attack a hostile enemy, such as by seeding clouds with chemicals to 
bring about rain or by calling down artificial lightning on enemy 
positions. 72 Other highly destructive techniques, such as bombing 
dams and other water works to create flooding, are not specifically 
prohibited and are more practically useful to the military. 73 
Moreover, under the En-Mod Convention, the scope of the de-
struction resulting from prohibited environmental modifications 
must be wide-spread, long lasting and severe.74 The existence of this 
prerequisite threshold of damage as a part of the treaty allows for 
limited usage of environmental modification in the context of military 
operations as long as the results of the manipulations do not exceed 
the threshold. 75 Non-hostile uses are completely exempt from the 
prohibition, even if they produce destructive results above the 
threshold. 76 These significant textual deficiencies may account for 
70 En-Mod Art. 11,31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, supra note 67. 
71 "[S]eemingly only those techniques of environmental modification beyond the .scope of 
rational war-making have been forbidden, [while] what is militarily attractive remains per-
missible, or at least not explicitly prohibited, whereas that which is of no evident relevance 
to war-making is diligently proscribed." FALK supra note 25, at 167. 
72 Goldblat supra note 58, at 55; see also Arthur H. Westing, Environrtu3ntal Hazards of 
War in an Industrializing World, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE supra note 58, at 6. 
73 The classic example of such environmental warfare occurred during the Second Sino-
Japanese War, when the Chinese dynamited the Huayuankow dike of the Yellow River in an 
attempt to halt the marching Japanese forces. Goldblat supra note 58, at 55. This military 
tactic succeeded in drowning several thousand Japanese soldiers and halting their advance 
into China along this front. Id. The resulting flooding, however, ravaged three provinces and 
inundated several million hectares of farmland. Id. The human costs were staggering: eleven 
cities and 4,000 villages were flooded, killing at least several hundred thousand civilians and 
leaving several million homeless. I d. This little known act of environmental warfare, performed 
by a defending army, is perhaps the single most devastating act in all human history in terms 
of the number of lives claimed. Id. 
74 I d. at 54. "Widespread" is defined as encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred 
square kilometers; "long-lasting" implies lasting for a period of several months, or approxi-
mately one season; and "severe" involves serious or significant disruption or harm to human 
life, natural and economic resources, or other assets. Id. 
76/d. at 56. 
761d. at 53. 
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the limited acceptance of the En-Mod Convention by the nations of 
the world. 77 
2. Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
The International Committee of the Red Cross has made further 
strides to protect the environment from the dangers of modern 
warfare. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
Treaty (Protocoll)78 stresses, extends, and clarifies the environmen-
tal controls expressed in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. 79 Un-
der this protocol's provisions, combatants must protect the environ-
ment against widespread, long-term and severe damage and must 
avoid methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be 
expected to cause such damage to the environment. 8o Parties to the 
Protocol must refrain from targeting objects and structures that are 
essential to the subsistence of the civilian population81 or which 
contain dangerous forces82 and may not make the natural environ-
ment the target of reprisals. 83 
This seemingly curative document, however, is in many ways more 
seriously flawed than the ineffectual En-Mod Convention.84 For ex-
ample, the almost identical thresholds for environmental damage 
used in these two treaties are subject to significantly different in-
terpretations. 85 The En-Mod Convention requires the presence of 
only one of its three threshold criteria-widespread, long lasting, or 
severe damage-for the prohibition to come into effect, while Pro-
tocol I has been interpreted by scholars as requiring all three of its 
criteria-widespread, long-term, and severe damage-for the con-
vention to be applicable. 86 The textual interpretation of such similar 
77Id. 
78 Protocol I, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 16 I.L.M. 1391, supra note 38; reprinted 
in COMMENTARY supra note 39, at 3. 
79 COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at xxxiv. 
80 Protocol I, Art. 55, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 16 I.L.M. 1391, supra note 38. 
81 I d. at art. 35. 
82 Id. at art. 56 (e.g. nuclear reactors.) 
83 Id. at art. 56. "Reprisals are such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of 
one State against another as are exceptionally permitted for the purpose of compelling the 
latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by its own international 
delinquency." H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR AND 
NEUTRALITY §33 (1948). 
84 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
85 Jozef Goldblat, The Mitigation of Environmental Disruption by War: Legal Approaches, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OF WAR: RELEASING DANGEROUS FORCES IN AN INDUSTRIAL-
IZED WORLD 52 (Arthur Westing ed. 1990) [hereinafter "Goldblat II"]. 
"'" Id. 
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terms as "long-lasting" and "long-term" is also wildly divergent be-
tween the two treaties. 87 
Furthermore, the very strengths of the Protocol have served to 
limit its efficacy. Some nations, in particular the United States, have 
been unwilling to restrict their military options by becoming parties 
to the Protocol. 88 Military strategists and sympathetic scholars are 
particularly disturbed by the environmental protections afforded 
under the Protocol. 89 These observers see the Protocol's environ-
mental provisions as ambiguous and subject to divergent interpre-
tation. 90 
Additionally, some scholars argue that there should not be what 
is seen as a "should have known" standard for military commanders 
whose actions result in environmental damage above the Protocol's 
threshold. 91 Under such a wide-reaching prohibition, commanders 
could be subject to war crimes charges for incidental environmental 
damage resulting from military operations. 92 
Similarly, the restriction against bombing structures which contain 
dangerous forces would protect objects that would be considered 
legitimate military objectives to many nations under existing inter-
national law. 93 Although the Protocol would allow an attack on, for 
example, a nuclear power plant that directly supported an enemy's 
military operations by generating electricity, the Protocol would not 
allow an attack against the same plant if it was being used to produce 
weapons grade plutonium ostensibly for peaceful uses. 94 Under ex-
isting international law, an attack on such facilities containing dan-
gerous forces would be illegal only if the attack in fact resulted in 
such an excessive number of civilian casualties that it could only be 
interpreted as an intentional attack on the civilian population. 95 The 
87 Negotiators of the En-Mod Convention understood the term "long-lasting" as something 
lasting for a period of a month, or for approximately a season. Id. at 52. "Long-term" as used 
in Protocol I, on the other hand, has been interpreted as meaning lasting for decades. Id. 
88 See, e.g., Martin Dupuis et ai., The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington 
College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary 
International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. 
U. J. INT'L POL'y & L. 415, 434 (statements of Michael J. Matheson, U.S. State Dept.). 
89 Id.; Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules of Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of 
Additional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 148 (1986). 
90 Roberts supra note 89, at 148. 
91 See id. 
92 Id. 
93 Dupuis supra note 88, at 468 (remarks of Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. 
State Dept., Jan. 22, 1987). 
94 Id. at 468-69. 
95 Roberts supra note 89, at 156. See infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text (doctrine 
of proportionality). 
I 
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ambiguous environmental protections created under the Protocol are 
seen by more hawkish commentators as serving only to hinder the 
military in an area which international law already encompasses. 96 
These arguments have a counter-intuitive, and quite disturbing, 
underlying rationale. A spokesperson for the United States govern-
ment has stated that one of the reasons the United States is unwilling 
to ratify the Protocol is that the treaty's environmental provisions 
would prevent military strategists from balancing civilian losses 
against the military values of targets. 97 The very purpose for the 
development of the humanitarian Law of War, however, is to protect 
civilians and to prevent nations from engaging in such military cal-
culations. 98 
Given this more progressive view, the Law of War, almost by 
definition, will grow more restrictive as it evolves, both in the con-
ventional and customary contexts. 99 Military decision-making must 
be tempered by the humanitarian laws of war. 1OO Therefore, it is 
important to understand the legal evolution, or customization, of 
conventional humanitarian law in the context of modern warfare. 
D. The "Customization" of the Conventional Law of War 
After World War II, the Nuremberg War Tribunal was established 
by the Allies to try Nazi war criminals. 101 In the course of these 
prosecutions, the Tribunal recognized the Hague Conventions on 
Land Warfare of 1899 and 1907 as customary international law. 102 
Therefore, the law of the Hague would be binding even on states 
which had declined to ratify these treaties. Of particular significance, 
as outlined in the Hague Conventions, plundering public or private 
property or destroying cities and towns without adequate military 
justification became an actionable war crime under customary inter-
national law. 103 
Additionally, some scholars have argued that certain portions. of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions have become customary law because 
96 Dupuis supra note 88, at 436. 
97 Id. at 468. 
96 See WELLS supra note 48, at 29. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946-1955 
21 (1989). 
102 See F ALK supra note 25, at 169. 
103 See supra note 55-57 and accompanying text. 
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of the widespread acceptance of the treaties. 104 In fact, the ICJ has 
accepted certain portions of the Geneva Conventions as customary 
law. 105 
Some writers, however, have criticized the ICJ's failure to discuss 
evidence in support of this significant legal transformation of con-
vention into custom.106 The large number of nations which accept 
the Geneva Conventions, rather than evidencing a development of 
well-accepted custom, may actually obscure the degree to which the 
treaties have become customary law.107 As parties to the treaties, 
nations may be simply following their conventional obligations 
rather than forging new customary practices. 108 Because of this 
possibility, the Geneva Conventions paradoxically may remain con-
ventional law rather than having evolved into customary law. 109 
Presumably, customs cannot develop when widely subscribed to con-
ventions already exist. 110 
Some scholars have even questioned the applicability of the law 
of the Hague, which has been generally accepted by the nations of 
the world as customary international law, III to some military situa-
tions. 112 Other writers have noted the unwillingness of some national 
courts to apply the Geneva treaties, even when the nation in question 
has ratified the treaties. 113 
For example, according the Israeli Supreme Court, the law of the 
Hague, but not the law of Geneva, should apply to occupied areas 
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, even though Israel is a party 
to both the Hague and Geneva Conventions. 114 The Israeli high court 
makes this distinction because the Geneva Conventions premise their 
applicability on the sovereignty of the land in question. 115 Sover-
104 "[I]f states parties comply with the Geneva Conventions in actual practice, verbally 
affirm their vital normative value, and accept them in opinio juris, states and tribunals will 
be reluctant to make and accept the argument that the law of Geneva is solely, or even 
primarily, conventional." Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 
AM. J. INT'L LAW 348,350 (1987). See also Esther R. Cohen, Justicefor Occupied Territory? 
The Israeli High Court of Justice Paradigm, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 472, 483 (1986). 
105 Meron supra note 104, at 358. 
106 Id. 




111 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
112 Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria (the 
West Bank) and the Gaza Strip, 24 ISRAEL L. REV. 485, 495 (1990). 
113 Esther Cohen supra note 104, at 482-83. 
114Id. 
115Id. 
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eignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is a crucial issue in 
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and therefore the law of Geneva is 
not applied by Israeli courts to these areas. 116 Conversely, the law 
of the Hague does not contain such overt references to sovereignty, 
and as interpreted by the Israeli Supreme Court, does apply in the 
Palestinian situation. 117 
Additionally, some scholars have questioned the validity of the 
law of the Hague because of its technical obsolescence. 118 The scope 
of military technology has outstripped the wording of the law of the 
Hague, and therefore scholars perceive the modern relevance of the 
treaty to be limited. 119 This interpretation of obsolescence seems to 
hinge on an extremely static view of conventional international law. 
Even assuming this alleged lack of relevance, there remains a fun-
damental axiom from these early European treaties that acts of war 
should not cause unnecessary or disproportionate suffering with re-
gard to the military advantages to be gained. 120 Such broad asser-
tions do not stem from the pages of treaties but grow from the 
practice of nations. 121 Although the wording of conventions may 
become obsolete with time, the development of custom surrounding 
these conventions creates a more timely and widely applicable source 
of law. 122 
IV. CUSTOM AND THE LAW OF WAR 
Although there is no single scholarly work which originated the 
principles of the customary Law of War, certain key principles gov-
erning the conduct of war can be readily identified by scholars. 123 
These include the principles of humanity, discrimination, propor-
tionality and necessity.124 
116Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Hamilton DeSaussure, Symposium on the 1977 Geneva Protocols: Introduction, 19 AK-
RON L. REV. 521, 521 (1986). 
119Id. 
120 Id.; see infra notes 129~2 and accompanying text. 
121 See generally infra notes 123-72 and accompanying text. 
122 Id. 
123 Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR: A 'FIFI'H GENEVA' CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN TIME OF ARMED CONFLICT 84 (Glen Plant ed. 1992) [hereinafter 
"Falk II"]. 
124 Id. The author also posited that principles of neutrality-warfare may not injure neutral 
parties-and inter-generational equity-warfare may not risk harm to the unborn-are ad-
ditional, well-grounded customary principles. Id. 
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The principle of humanity proscribes the use of methods of warfare 
which cause needless suffering in the form of protracted or painful 
death, or which are designed to inspire terror. 125 Poisonous, bacte-
riological, or teratogenic (gene-altering) weapons, for example, are 
unacceptable under this standard. 126 
The principle of discrimination states that weapons and tactics 
clearly must discriminate between military objectives and civilian 
targets. 127 Indiscriminate attacks, which are illegal by definition, do 
not include attacks which indirectly cause collateral, or incidental, 
damage to civilians and their property. 128 
The principle of proportionality requires that weapons and tactics 
must be geared proportionally toward their military objective. l29 
Simply put, the military means employed must be balanced against 
the overall strategic end which is sought. 130 
Similar to the principle of proportionality, the principle of neces-
sity requires that military tactics involving the use of force must be 
reasonably necessary to the achievement of the desired objective. 131 
For example, a submarine attempting to avoid detection after tor-
pedoing a ship may not kill the struggling members of the ship's 
crew, but must depart the area as quickly as possible. 132 
One commentator has suggested that these four principles may be 
applied to instances of environmental destruction, whether done 
125 Falk II supra note 123, at 84. 
126 Id. See also WELLS supra note 48, at 34. Poison and perfidy-which encompasses treach-
erous acts such as the misuse of the flag of surrender-are two tactics which have generally 
been condemned as means of warfare. WELLS supra note 48, at 34. Of course, both poison 
and perfidy are techniques which give the weak power over the strong and, therefore, 
traditional notions of fairness may be rooted, in this instance, in traditional notions of the 
status quo. 
127 Falk II supra note 123, at 84. A military objective may be defined as, ''those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose, or use effectively contribute to military action ... [and 
also] any object whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization offers a military 
advantage must be considered a military objective." L. Lynn Hague, Identifying Customary 
International Law of War in Protocol I: A Proposed Restatement, 13 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & 
COMPo L. REV. 279, 300 (1990). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. Cf Arthur W. Ravine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 118, 123-24 (1973). U[T]he war making potential 
of ... [civilian] facilities may outweigh their importance to the civilian economy and deny them 
immunity from attack." Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Falk II supra note 39, at 84. See also INGRID DETTER LUPUIS, THE LAW OF WAR, 336 
(1987). ''Where there is an alternative means of accomplishing the military goal, a more 
destructive option will not be sanctioned under military necessity." DETTER LUPUIS supra 
note 131, at 336. 
182 DETTER LUPUIS supra note 131, at 336. 
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recklessly or intentionally.l33 In this regard, nations must examine 
the compatibility, and therefore the legality, of the use of new weap-
ons with pre-existing principles of the Law of War. 134 For example, 
a new weapon or military tactic which has decidedly indiscriminate 
effects, causing uncontrollable harm to both military and civilian 
targets, is prohibited under the existing doctrine of discrimination. 
Nations and their military operatives, however, may subvert these 
four limiting principles with a closely related yet antithetical doc-
trine, military necessity, which serves to validate rather than elim-
inate certain practices. 135 Military necessity is a subjective doctrine 
which "authorizes" military action when such action is necessary for 
the overall resolution of a conflict, particularly where the continued 
existence of the acting state would otherwise be in jeopardy. 136 Mil-
itary necessity may therefore involve the balancing of military needs 
against lives, both military and civilian, in the overall context of 
war. 137 
For example, during the Battle of Normandy in World War II, 
the Allied forces heavily bombed towns which contained both Ger-
man soldiers and French civilians. 138 Although the loss of civilian life 
was great, these air battles provided the foothold the Allies needed 
to free France and later to conquer Nazi Germany.139 Such a balanc-
ing of military needs over civilian lives is conceptually proper under 
the doctrine of military necessity. 140 
Many commentators have criticized the problematic defense of 
military necessity.141 Many have decried the doctrine because it un-
dermines the salutary effect of the humanitarian Law of War by 
133 Falk II supra note 123, at 84. 
134 See id. 
135 "There is no need to emphasize that [the doctrine of military necessity] is a dangerous 
and hannful doctrine, providing as it does a loophole, an excuse, for every conceivable 
situation." DE'ITER LUPUIS supra note 131, at 333. It is important to note that both the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions provide specific exceptions for military necessity. [d. at 334-
35 (1907 Hague Convention IV, art. 23(g); 1949 Geneva Convention IV, art. 53). 
136 ''When the existence or the necessary development of a state stands in unavoidable 
conflict with such state's treaty obligations, the latter must give way, for the self-preservation 
and development ... of the nation are the primary duties of every state." BURLEIGH CUSHING 
RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 44 (1928). The individual 
state's sovereign right of self-preservation, however, may not necessarily be recognized in an 
international forum as abrogating the state's conventional responsibilities in the greater forum 
of international law. See id. 




141 See, e.g., FALK supra note 25, at 168. 
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providing a defense for almost any breach. 142 As long as military 
strategists alone determined what is militarily necessary, propor-
tionality will remain mere prudence in the conservation of military 
resources rather than serve as a check against violence. 143 Further-
more, the doctrine does not serve as a regulatory limit in any real 
sense because a military commander's determinations of "necessity" 
made in the heat of battle will be almost impossible to second 
guess. 144 Only in retrospect, and then by the victorious judging the 
deeds of the vanquished, would wanton destruction create a basis 
for legal accountability. 145 
The concept of military necessity is a great hindrance to interna-
tional lawmaking because there is little reason, in the view of some 
scholars, for powerful, technologically advanced nations, such as the 
United States, to assume the burden of military restraints. 146 For 
example, American military planners consistently have resisted at-
tempts-whether through conventional agreements or pronounce-
ments of customary law-to limit "useful" military options that in-
volve deliberate environmental destruction, such as the extensive 
use of herbicides in Vietnam. 147 Quite expectedly, attempts to limit 
the scope of the doctrine of military necessity also have not been 
well received by some scholars. 148 
In fact, after the carnage of the world wars, some commentators 
noted that it had become almost impossible to judge exactly what 
military actions are excessive. 149 The concept of "total war" evolved 
142 "The dictates of military necessity, as assessed by opposed leaderships, have taken 
consistent precedence over the laws of war in almost every critical aspect of belligerent 
policy." I d. 
143 WELLS supra note 48, at 29. 
144 F ALK supra note 25, at 172. Some scholars have criticized what is seen as an inappropriate 
delegation of responsibility to field commanders for deciding in the heat of battle what is 
lawful and what is not. Goldblat II supra note 85, at 51-52; see also Lt. Col. Burrus M. 
Carnahan, Additional Protocol I: A Military View, 19 AKRON L. REV. 521, 544 (1986). 
145 FALK supra note 25, at 172 (discussing environmental destruction). 
146 E.g., Richard A. Falk, Environmental Disruption by Military Means and in Interna-
tional Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ApPRAISAL 
34 (Arthur H. Westing ed. 1984) [hereinafter "Falk III"]. 
147Id. 
148 For example, under Protocol I, potential targets that are not readily identifiable as 
military or civilian objects must be presumed to be civilian objects and therefore are not 
subject to attack. Roberts supra note 88, at 150-51. Some writers argue that such battlefield 
hesitation may have dire consequences for attacking military forces and that such presumptive 
civilian status would make modern warfare almost impossible. Id. 
149 "The conventional acts of war have become so barbaric that we are at a loss to identify 
the criterion by which excessive acts are to be identified. If Nazi concentration camps were 
excessive because they used cruel and excessive punishments, how does napalm escape such 
condemnation?" WELLS supra note 48, at 11. 
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from these two global conflicts in which the destruction of entire 
cities such as London, Berlin, Tokyo, Dresden, and most infamously 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, became an acceptable military strategy. 150 
For a nation, the final determining factor in a military conflict re-
mains the survival of the state, and therefore the Law of War will 
fall before military necessity.151 Similarly, the German concept of 
kriegraison broadly holds that any reason or necessity of war dis-
places the customs of war, and thus, potentially protecting the mil-
itary success of even an individual operation or battle. 152 
The doctrine of military necessity is a product of customary law 
and should therefore be subject to the same type of construction as 
other developing fields of international law. l53 Customary interna-
tional law springs from a general consensus among nations, and 
therefore can serve to induce nations to act, or not to act, in certain 
ways.l54 Similarly, conventions, treaties, or other international 
agreements can assist in transforming a vague consensus or general 
feeling regarding proper state action into a precise legal norm that 
can be used as a measure for proper behavior, both by nations and 
by courts of law. 155 Even in cases not covered by existing military 
agreements, combatants and civilians remain under the protection 
of the principles of the law of civilized nations, the law of humanity, 
and the dictates of public conscience. l56 This broad-based protection 
was embodied in the Martens Clause of the Hague Conventions, 157 
and it has long been accepted by scholars and international tribunals 
as customary international law. 158 
The existence of customary law may in some ways be preferable 
to that of conventional law because the former exists generally for 
all parties, while the latter may require actuating legislation by the 
150 See F ALK supra note 25, at 168. 
151 Supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
152 DE'ITER LuPUIS supra note 131, at 335. This doctrine has met with disapproval. Id. 
153 See supra note 135-45 and accompanying text. 
154 Jon Van Dyke, The Riddle of Establishing Clear and Workable Rules to Govern Armed 
Conflict, 3 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN J. 34, 36 (1984); see also Meron supra note 104, at 368 
(development of Law of Geneva and parallel developments in customary law). 
155 Id. 
156 Goldblat II supra note 85, at 59. 
157 "Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting 
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted 
by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the 
principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established by civilized peoples, 
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public consciences." Hague Convention IV, 36 
Stat. 2277, T.S. no. 539 (preamble); see also Hague 1899 (II) supra note 46, at 129 (preamble). 
158 Goldblat II supra note 85, at 59. 
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signatory, or signing party.159 While a state party's failure to enact 
the necessary legislation to transform an international treaty into 
internal law cannot affect the international obligations of these coun-
tries, invoking a customary norm may be crucial in some situations 
for protection of the individuals concerned. 160 Commonly held beliefs 
or customs will be easier to pursue on a practical level, particularly 
in times of conflict, than the contractual subtleties of an international 
agreement. 
In general, the customary Law of War rejects the claim that 
whatever is necessary for victory is acceptable. 161 Although military 
necessity is a consideration, some weapons and tactics are forbidden 
absolutely, and remain criminal even if a war will be lost without 
their use. 162 Military considerations cannot be the exclusive guide 
for military action, because such a characterization could be used by 
an aggressor to justify any action for almost any reason. l63 To allow 
military necessity to be the yardstick by which to measure military 
action forces the Law of War into a downward spiral of logical 
circularity-if it was done, it was necessary. Necessity is not an 
established fact, but an interpretation. 164 
Following this unbridled view of military necessity, even the Nazi 
atrocities of World War II could be rationalized~ews, gypsies, 
homosexuals and communists were viewed by the Nazis as posing 
an internal threat to Germany and therefore the systematic slaugh-
tering of these groups was "militarily necessary. "165 Similarly, the 
bombing of the Kuwaiti oil wells could be construed as a necessary 
covering action for the retreating Iraqi forces. 166 Such a broad in-
159 Meron supra note 104, at 348-49. 
160 [d. For example, if the United States ratifies a treaty, but fails to enact federal legislation 
to initiate internal compliance with the treaty, the United States is still bound by the treaty. 
However, by arguing that the law is customary as well as conventional, the failure to enact 
the proper internal legislation is not even a procedural excuse because the customary law 
existed independently of the conventional codification. 
161 COHEN supra note 44, at 35. 
162 [d. 
163 F ALK supra note 25, at 168. 
164 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE POWER TO WILL §552(a) (Walter Kaufman ed. 1968). 
165 "For it will take a struggle [to establish a folkish state in Germany], in view of the fact 
that the first task is not to create a folkish state conception, but above all elimination [sic] of 
the existing Jewish one." ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 453 (1943); see also Lucy S. DAWI-
DOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 70 (1975) ("Elimination of the Jews from our com-
munity is to be regarded as an emergency defense measure." Adolph Hitler). 
166 One expert, having witnessed the fires and the Iraqi defense in Kuwait, has questioned 
the underlying motivation for the fires. Golob interview supra note 5. While the Iraqis set 
hundreds of oil wells on fire, requiring a great deal of last minute time and effort by the 
retreating soldiers, they failed to ignite long trenches of crude oil, which had been carefully 
500 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:479 
terpretation of necessity, premised solely on the interpretations of 
military strategists, could sanction any military abomination and 
truly would make it impossible to regulate the conduct of war in any 
meaningful sense. 167 
Although it seems clear that determinations of military necessity 
will always be fraught with problems of subjectivity, more stringent 
interpretations by scholars and by international tribunals would 
pressure military commanders to err in their decisions on the side 
of restraint. 168 The doctrine of military necessity, as a creature of 
international law, is only as broad as it is interpreted to be. 169 There-
fore, customary practice regarding the extent to which a nation may 
inflict destruction on the environment must limit the doctrine of 
military necessity.170 To leave determinations of military necessity 
solely in the hands of the belligerent parties would transform a 
powerful international check against violence into an ineffectual ap-
peal to the conscience of a warring nation.171 The moral aspirations 
of scholars, whether in the form of feckless interpretations of the 
law or impotent conventions, serve no one.172 It is important to 
review modern developments in international law regarding the pro-
tection of the environment in addition to the Law of War in order 
to examine comprehensively the modern landscape of military ne-
cessity as it pertains to environmental destruction. 
V. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Several international tribunals have examined the question of 
whether a nation is free to use its territory for whatever purpose it 
prepared as a defense against the American invasion. ld. This information seems to indicate 
that Saddam Hussein ordered the oil well fires to be set in one last hurried act of defiance 
rather than for military purposes. 
167 See F ALK supra note 25, at 169. 
168 "Given the scarcity of actual practice, it may well be that, in reality, tribunals have been 
guided, and are more likely to continue to be guided, by the degree of offensiveness of certain 
acts to human dignity; the more heinous the act, the more the tribunal will assume that it 
violates not only a moral principle of humanity but also a positive norm of customary law." 
Meron supra note 104, at 361. 
169 See generally Schafer supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
170 See id. 
171 "[T]he conscience of belligerents [is] frail support to rely on." JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, 
THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 281 (1958). In fact, 
it has been suggested that the underlying legality of the belligerent's actions should be weighed 
in determining whether the exception of military necessity may be invoked at all. Zedalis 
supra note 66, at 751. 
172 "While writers continued for generations to repeat that the law did make the distinction 
[between lawful and unlawful wars], their treatment of the matter took on more and more 
the aspect of a moral aspiration or of mere literary convention, and ceased to be an enunciation 
of a rule of law in the existence of which they genuinely believed." ld. at 282. 
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chooses, at the expense of nearby nations. 173 In the Trail Smelter 
Case, fumes from a Canadian smelting plant caused damage to land 
and citizens over the international border, in the United States. 174 
An international tribunal convened to mediate the dispute held that, 
"no state has the right to use or [to] permit the use of its territory 
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes. . . to the territory of 
another or the properties or persons therein."175 Therefore, a nation 
may be held liable for its internal acts if the deleterious effects of 
these actions escape its territorial boundaries. 176 
The ICJ has also issued certain decisions regarding the rights of 
nations which have been injured by another nation's use of its own 
property.177 In the Corfu Channel case, two British warships were 
damaged when they struck Albanian mines. 178 The Albanian govern-
ment did not report the presence of these mines to the world com-
munity.179 The Court ruled, as a matter of customary international 
law, that Great Britain had a right to send its warships through the 
waters in question, and, more importantly, that it is every nation's 
obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other nations. ISO The ICJ's ruling confirms 
that the duty not to do harm to another, non-belligerent nation exists 
even in a military context. 181 
The international community has taken additional steps to respond 
specifically to environmental destruction in the course of warfare. 182 
In reaction to environmental abuses by the United States during the 
Vietnam War, the United Nations held an international conference 
on the environment in Stockholm. l83 At this conference, the partic-
173 See e.g. The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.) 3 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS, 1905 (1949). 
174Id. at 1907. 
175Id. at 1965. The case in question must also be of serious consequence and the injuries 
sustained must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 
176 See id. at 1966. 
177 See, e.g. The Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 12 (vol.1). 
176 Id. 
179 Quincy Wright, The Corfu Channel Case, 43 AM. J. INTL L. 491, 492 (1949). 
ISO See id. The ICJ deemed the principles relied upon to be self-evident and stated them 
without precedent or authority. Id. at 494. 
181 Many states which were not involved in the Persian Gulf hostilities, such as Iran and 
Yemen, were affected by the Iraqi oil spill and the Kuwait oil fires. Earle supra note 15, at 
129. 
182 See, e.g. supra note 67 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive, albeit cursory, 
survey of the modern military conventions which in some way deal with the environment, see 
Margaret T. Okorodudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian Gulf War: Legal Appraisal of an Envi-
ronmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 123, 160-97 (1991). 
183 See SIPRI supra note 68, at 59. Some nations were particularly concerned by the United 
States' attempts at environmental modifications, that is cloud seeding and bombing dams and 
dikes to cause flooding, and its extensive use of herbicides on the Vietnamese jungles. Id. 
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ipants prepared twenty-six principles relating to the relationship 
and rights of humankind pertaining to the environment. 184 
Soon after the preparation of the Stockholm Declaration, the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations adopted the World Charter for 
Nature. l85 The Charter's provisions directly address the damaging 
effects warfare has upon the environment and specifically sought to 
limit environmental destruction in the course of warfare. 186 The Gen-
eral Assembly adopted the Charter almost unanimously, with only 
seventeen countries abstaining, mostly developing Third World na-
tions, and a single vote against, cast by the United States. 187 Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia did not even express reservations to the 
Charter. 188 
Despite the overwhelming approval of these principles, General 
Assembly resolutions are not binding legislation in any sense, be-
cause they express recommendations rather than legal restric-
tions. 189 The wide consensus represented by these two United Na-
184 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
June 16, 1972, U.N. Assembly Doc. AlConf. 48/14/Rev. (1973); 11 I.L.M. 1416. [hereinafter 
the Stockholm Declaration]. Principles 6 and 7 are particularly relevant to the Gulf War 
problem: 
6. The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the release of heat, in such 
quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them 
harmless, had to be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage was not 
inflicted upon ecosystems. The just struggle of the peoples of all countries against pollution 
should be supported. 
7. States were to take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that 
were liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to 
damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea. 
Id. at 1418. 
185 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1024-25. 
186 I. General Principles. . . 
1. Nature shall be protected and its essential processes shall not be impaired. . . 
2. Nature shall be secure against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activi-
ties ... 
III. Implementation 
14. The principles set forth in the present Charter shall be reflected in the law and practice 
of each State, as well as at the international level. .. 
20. Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided. 
Id. at 1025, 1026 (emphasis added). 
187Id. at 1026. The U.S. expressed difficulties with certain passages of the Charter that 1) 
suggested that the United Nations could in some way work to prevent natural disasters 
(paragraph 13), and 2) sought to create individual obligations under the Charter (paragraph 
24). Id. at 1024. 
188 See id. at 1023-24. 
189 "[T]he General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any 
situation," Art. 14, Charter of the United Nations, reprinted in 1970 U.N. Y.B. 1001, 1003 
(emphasis added). 
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tions documents, however, indicates that the world community, with 
one notable exception, agrees that the environment deserves pro-
tection from the ravaging effects of war. In the context of these 
documents and the instructive decisions in the Trail Smelter Case 
and Corfu Channel, it is clear that the world community should not 
countenance Iraq's military actions against the environment. 190 
VI. THE LEGALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION IN 
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND BEYOND 
Iraq is not a party to the major military conventions which spe-
cifically prohibit environmental destruction. Iraq has not ratified 
either the En-Mod Convention or Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 191 Iraq is, however, a party to both the Hague Con-
ventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which contain certain 
provisions which have been construed by scholars as protecting the 
environment. l92 Although the specific environmental protections af-
forded by the more recent conventions, specifically the En-Mod Con-
vention and Protocol I, are not applicable to Iraq, the earlier pro-
visions are sufficient to address the environmental offenses 
committed in Kuwait. 193 
This characterization of the early conventional law is particularly 
appropriate given the preexisting customary law limitations on war-
fare. l94 The customary Law of War contains numerous limitations on 
the extent to which parties may wage war.195 An expansive inter-
pretation of the laws of the Hague and Geneva which precludes the 
"oil warfare" of the Gulf War is both appropriate and defensible. l96 
Although the existing law, conventional and customary, does not 
specifically proscribe the Iraqi actions, international law may be 
readily interpreted to encompass these military operations. A court 
190 See supra note 173-81 and accompanying text. Although I run the risk of being relegated 
to an intellectual "Camp" as propounded by a recent book on the environmental destruction 
of the Gulf War, the Law of War as it presently exists is broad enough to encompass the 
actions of the Iraqi military. Compare Glen Plant, Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR supra note 123, at 21. Although a new convention which 
serves to clarify the Law of War regarding environmental destruction would be a welcomed 
development, a reformulation of the law would have to be applied in an unacceptably expos 
factos manner to Iraq. See id. 
191 COMMENTARY supra note 39, at 1556-57. 
192 Id. 
193 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
194 Supra note 123-32 and accompanying text. 
195 Supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 173-91 and accompanying text. 
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of law, such as the International Court of Justice, or a war crimes 
tribunal, such as the Nuremberg tribunal, can be convened to weigh 
the evidence against Iraq and to apply the existing humanitarian 
laws of war. 197 
There remain, however, several sticking points. Even if the na-
tions of the world universally condemn the intentional destruction 
of the environment as a means of warfare, this abstract interpreta-
tion must be actualized. The United States and its allies soundly 
defeated Iraq and the Iraqi soldiers were forcibly ejected from Ku-
wait. Unfortunately, the world community has taken no steps to 
bring war crimes charges against the Iraqi government or individual 
soldiers for the their deeds. 198 
This hesitancy by the world community to. enforce the laws of war 
allows nations acting under the guise of self-defense to wreak havoc 
on neighboring states. This reticence is particularly troubling now 
that Iraq has begun to once again defy the international mandate of 
the United Nations Security Council.l99 Saddam Hussein's forces 
have harassed Iraqi Kurds in the north and have bombed and strafed 
Shi'ite rebels in Iraq's southern marshes. 2OO The world remains tense 
in the wake of Saddam Hussein's continued aggressions towards 
Kuwait and the United States.20l 
Moreover, the world community's failure to prosecute Iraqi war 
criminals seems to have set, or perhaps reinforced, an unacceptable 
precedent against pursuing war crimes prosecutions. In the wake of 
this global indecision, ethnic wars have overwhelmed the world the-
ater. Serbian military forces have slaughtered civilians in Sarajevo 
and have imprisoned starving Bosnian muslims in concentration 
camps.202 Rival Somalian clans squabble over humanitarian food ship-
ments while children starve by the thousands. 203 South African black 
political parties wage internecine warfare as the white government 
197 See, e.g., supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
198 Although this article is chiefly concerned with the environmental crimes committed during 
the Gulf War, there were many instances of egregious human rights violations committed by 
the Iraqis prior to the allied military intervention in Kuwait. See generally L. Hague supra 
note 127. 
199 J.F.O. McAllister, The Other Player, TIME, August 10, 1992, at 30 (Saddam Hussein 
defies U.N. weapons inspectors and President Bush and then "retreats"). 
200 [d. 
201 Brian Duffy, Saddam Hussein: The Energizer Bully, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
Jan. 25, 1993 at 58. 
202 See J.F.O. McAllister, Atrocity and Outrage, TIME, August 17, 1992, at 21-24; Thomas 
C. Palmer Jr., A Lesson Unlearned in Yugoslavia, BOSTON GLOBE, August 9, 1992 at 69. 
203 James Walsh, Dilemma for the World, TIME, August 17, 1992 at 29. 
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struggles to maintain its control over a predominantly black na-
tion. 204 The American victory in the Gulf War was expected to herald 
in a new world order, not precede a year of murderous ethnic intol-
erance. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The nations of the world must act swiftly and resolutely to stem 
this growth of violence. The United Nations must establish a war 
crimes tribunal to investigate and to prosecute the Iraqi offenses 
against Kuwaiti, Kurdish and Shi'ite civilians as well as against the 
environment. The Nuremberg war tribunal stands as an example by 
which such a body could designed.205 
Some commentators may balk at the creation of such a tribunal 
because of the risk of visiting "victor's justice" upon the loser of a 
conflict.206 To minimize such a hazard, the judges of the Gulf War 
tribunal should be chosen from nations which took part in the war 
against Iraq, thereby limiting any victor's bias. Many countries took 
no part in the Gulf War coalition. Although there may remain a 
minimal degree of bias on the tribunal against Iraq, this must be 
risked. To allow otherwise would effectively immunize war criminals 
whose acts universally offended the world community: paradoxically, 
the more heinous the act as perceived by the world community, the 
less likely that the act will be questioned for fear of judicial bias 
against the perpetrators. 
The prosecution of Iraqi war criminals also would send a signal to 
aggressor nations and political groups that their actions may be 
subject to the rigorous scrutiny of an international tribunal which 
has the power to convict and to punish. To reinforce this message, 
an international war crimes tribunal should remain in place as an 
integral part of the United Nations. 
This international hesitancy to accuse war criminals seems to re-
sult from a perversion of the biblical admonition against casting the 
first stone.207 Many nations could be subject to similar human rights 
scrutiny and therefore any move to establish a war crimes tribunal 
might be seen as an invitation to self prosecution. Because of this 
seemingly guilt driven inertia, war crimes go unpunished and the 
continuing cycle of violence is reinforced. 
204 Scott MacLeod, Part of the Solution?, TIME, August 10, 1992 at 42. 
205 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
206 See F ALK supra note 25, at 172. 
2Il7 "Let the man among you who has no sin be the first to cast a stone at her." John 8:8. 
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The Law of War exists, however, and it should be enforced. Ci-
vilians, as well as the environment, will suffer from continued abuses 
of the law. New conventions can be drafted and even ratified, but 
without proper enforcement, international law will remain an intel-
lectual exercise rather than a normative force. 
The time has come to put aside fears of being judged, as hard and 
impractical as that may sound. Only in this way will a stable situation 
come to pass in the post-Cold War era. To legitimize a move toward 
enforcement, the United States should be willing to submit to the 
jurisdiction of any proposed international war crimes tribunal. If 
America's leaders are willing to decry the Iraqi offenses and to 
denounce Serbian aggression, they should in fairness place America's 
own actions under similar international scrutiny. 
If the United States cannot withstand such an international in-
quiry, perhaps it is time that the United States leadership re-ex-
amined its military policies and prepared itself for a new, and more 
peaceful, world order. America's leaders must decide whether the 
United States will herald in such global order, or will remain a 
passive harbinger of chaos. If the United States does not become an 
architect of a global solution, it risks remaining a key figure in the 
environmental problem. 
